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CASENOTES
TORPEDOING THE UNIFORMITY OF MARITIME LAW:
AMERICAN DREDGING V. MILLER
One thing is unquestionable: the Constitution must have
referred to a system of law coextensive with, and operating
uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have
been intended to place the rules and limits of maritime law
under the disposal and regulation of the several states, as
that would have defeated the uniformity and consistency at
which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commer-
cial character affecting the intercourse of the states with
each other and with foreign states.1
Justice Joseph P. Bradley
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the United States Constitution, federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving maritime and admi-
ralty issues.2 Notable exceptions to this exclusivity arise under
the "savings to suitors" clause,' created by the Judiciary Act of
1789.4 Under this clause, state courts may hear cases involving
1. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917) (quoting The
Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575 (1874) (opinion of Bradley, J.)).
2. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
3. See, e.g., American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981 (1994).
4. In American Dredging, Justice Scalia quotes the Judiciary Act of 1789 which
provides, in relevant part,
That the district courts shall have, exclusively of the courts of the sever-
al [s]tates ... exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiral-
ty and maritime jurisdiction ... within their respective districts as well
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maritime or admiralty disputes when state law adequately
provides a remedy.' Within these suits, however, the state
courts must apply substantive federal maritime law under the
doctrine of preemption and federal supremacy.' Yet, the state
courts may provide remedies and attach requirements to those
remedies as they see fit, except when these provisions cause
material prejudice to a characteristic feature of maritime law or
interfere with the uniformity and proper harmony of maritime
law administration.7
The well-settled doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a
court to decline to hear a case, even when the statutory and
constitutional requirements of jurisdiction and venue have been
met.' This doctrine assures that a defendant, though within a
particular court's reach, will not be subject to unreasonable
oppression or harassment by suit in that court.9
Forum non conveniens has enjoyed popularity in maritime
lawsuits." However, there exists some dispute as to whether
the doctrine is a "characteristic feature" of admiralty law, and
whether a state's rejection of that doctrine in admiralty matters
interferes with the uniform application of maritime law." The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in
as upon the high seas; saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a com-
mon-law remedy where the common-law is competent to give it.
Id. at 984 (quoting the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333(1) (West 1993)) (alteration in original).
5. 20 U.S.CA. § 1333(1) (West 1993) (providing that "[t]he district courts shall
have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the states, of (1) [any civil cases
of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies
to which they are otherwise entitled." (emphasis added)).
6. See, e.g., American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 985; Garrett v. Moore-McCormack
Co., 317 U.S. 239, 243 (1942).
7. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
8. See Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947); see also David W. Robertson
& Paula K. Speck, Access to State Courts in Transnational Personal Injury Cases:
Forum non Conveniens and Antisuit Injunction, 68 TEX. L. REv. 937, 949 (1990).
9. Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508.
10. Harold K. Watson, Modern Procedural Considerations in Maritime Personal
Injury Litigation: Procedural Weapons for Venue Battle, 68 TUL. L. REV. 473, 480
(1994); see also Canada Malting Co. v. Patterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 421-23
(1932).
11. See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981 (1994); Ikospentakis v.
Thallasic S.S. Agency, 915 F.2d 659 (1990); Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 817
F.2d. 307 (1987), rev'd on other grounds, 486 U.S. 140 (1988).
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Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo' that forum non conveniens is
in fact a "characteristic feature" of maritime law, and its impo-
sition is necessary for the "uniform" administration of admiralty
law. 3 Applying federal preemption analysis, the court held
that a state statute prohibiting forum non conveniens in state
court admiralty proceedings was invalidated by the doctrine's
actual application in federal court.14
In 1994, the Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of
federal preemption of state forum non conveniens jurisprudence
in American Dredging Co. v. Miller.5 Justice Scalia, writing
for a five-justice majority, held that a Louisiana statute forbid-
ding the application of forum non conveniens in state court pro-
ceedings involving matters of admiralty was not preempted by
the doctrine's availability in the federal courts." Finding that
the doctrine is neither necessary to the uniform application of
maritime law nor a "characteristic feature" of maritime law, the
Court held that a state may decide to make forum non conveni-
ens available as it sees fit, without federal interference.'
This casenote will assess the validity of Justice Scalia's rea-
soning, contrast it with the Fifth Circuit's holding in Exxon
Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo,'8 which American Dredging effec-
tively overrules, and criticize the analysis at the heart of the
decision. Part H reviews previous Supreme Court decisions with
which American Dredging conflicts. Part III analyzes the hold-
ing of Exxon. Part IV introduces the facts and procedural histo-
ry of American Dredging. Parts V and VI challenge the inter-
pretation of forum non conveniens as an "uncharacteristic" fea-
ture of admiralty law and discuss the actual importance of a
uniform forum non conveniens doctrine in admiralty. Part VII
assesses the dichotomy upon which the Court partially based its
decision, and Part VIII predicts the decision's future ramifica-
tions.
12. 817 F.2d 307 (1987).
13. Id. at 320.
14. Id. at 324.
15. 114 S. Ct. 981 (1994).
16. Id. at 988.
17. Id. at 987-89.
18. The comparison will not be a line-by-line assessment, but rather an analysis
of the reasoning employed in both cases in addition to consideration of reasoning not
utilized in either opinion.
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II. PRIOR CASE LAW DEALING WITH PREEMPTION
A. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack 9
In 1942, the Supreme Court specifically underscored the need
for uniformity in admiralty suits under the Jones Act20 in
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack. Justice Black, in assessing the
validity of a state burden-of-proof requirement that contravened
federal maritime standards, rebuked the finding of the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court that "the burden of proof.., does not
affect the substantive rights of the parties, but is merely proce-
dural, and is therefore controlled by state law."2 Stating that
the Supreme Court had long required that the Jones Act have
uniform application regardless of local common law rules, Jus-
tice Black rejected any reliance on a bright line between proce-
dure and substance.' Rather, his analysis sought only to "as-
sure litigants frll protection for all substantive rights intended
to be afforded them by the jurisdiction in which the right itself
originates."' Litigants cannot rely on theoretical substantive
rights when local custom effectively bars access. State courts
must proceed so as to protect the substantive rights of par-
ties.' Thus, as early as 1942, the Supreme Court recognized
that substantive rights are only effective when regulated by the
procedures by which they are applied.' No room for state idio-
syncracies in maritime lawsuits exists; however, Justice Scalia
overlooks this crucial fact in American Dredging. In subrogating
a necessary federal maritime law policy to state determination,
American Dredging creates confusion for potential litigants."
19. 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
20. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1975).
21. 317 U.S. at 242.
22. Id. at 244.
23. Id. at 245.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 249.
26. See discussion infra part VIII.
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B. Missouri ex rel. Southern Railroad v. Mayfield27
The Supreme Court considered state forum non conveniens
provisions relating to the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA)" in Missouri ex rel. Southern Railway v. Mayfield. In
an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, the Court held that state
courts are free to apply their own procedural policies, including
forum non conveniens, when hearing FELA suits.'
Missouri's highest court had denied motions to dismiss based
on forum non conveniens in a decision involving two FELA suits
consolidated for argument." The Supreme Court was unsure of
the rationale used by the Missouri court in arriving at this
decision."' Justice Frankfurter made it clear that dismissals
under forum non conveniens are not to be denied simply be-
cause federal law empowers state courts to hear FELA suits. 2
Thus, if the doctrine is available in state actions, it should also
be available in state courts hearing FELA claims, so long as
the policy does not discriminate against FELA suits or nonresi-
dents.'
C. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen
In Jensen, the Supreme Court decided on the validity of a
remedy provided a widow under a New York state workmen's
compensation statute."5 Southern Pacific objected to the award,
claiming that because the decedent was employed in interstate
commerce as a stevedore, federal law should control and pre-
empt the New York statute." The opinion by Justice
27. 340 U.S. 1 (1950).
28. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
29. 340 U.S. at 7.
30. Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 224 S.W.2d 105 (Mo.), cert. granted
339 U.S. 98 (1949).
31. Mayfleld, 340 U.S. at 3.
32. Id. at 4.
33. Id. at 4-5. But see American Dredging v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981 (1994) (hold-
ing that a Louisiana statute specifically prohibiting forum non conveniens in Jones
Act cases in state court was valid despite the apparent discrimination).
34. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
35. Id. at 207-10.
36. Id. at 212.
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McReynolds dealt directly with the extent to which a state
court sitting in admiralty is bound to apply federal maritime
law over state law. Realizing that defining the limits of pre-
emption with exactness is impossible, the Court delineated
several guiding principles.37
Acknowledging that federal maritime law will not preempt
every state statute which may be applied in maritime cases,
Justice McReynolds held that a state statute is clearly invalid if
it serves to contravene an applicable act of Congress.' More
importantly, a state law will be preempted "if it contravenes
the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress or works
material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general
maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and unifor-
mity of that law."9 Using this analysis, the Court found that
the New York statute was preempted by the entire body of
federally created maritime law jurisprudence because it was
unknown to common law.'
III. THE ANALYSIS OF EXXON CORP. V. CHICK KAM CHOO
A. The Facts and Prior History of the Case
Madame Choo's husband was killed in Singapore while re-
pairing a ship owned by Exxon.4 She brought suit in federal
district court in Houston for damages under the Jones Act, the
Death on the High Seas Act,42 general maritime law claims,
and the Texas wrongful death statute.' The federal court
granted summary judgment in favor of Exxon on all but the
state claim, and Madame Choo subsequently brought the identi-
cal claims in a Texas state court in Houston." Exxon removed
the case on diversity grounds to the federal district court, which
dismissed the claims as res judicata and imposed sanctions on
37. Id. at 216.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 218.
41. Exxon, 817 F.2d 307, 309 (1987), rev'd on other grounds, 486 U.S. 140 (1988).
42. 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 761-68 (West 1975 & Cure. Supp. 1994).
43. 817 F.2d at 309.
44. Id.
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Choo's counsel.'5 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that com-
plete diversity did not exist and the sanctions were dissolved.4'
The suit returned to state court, and Exxon petitioned the fed-
eral court to enjoin the state court from proceeding.47 Among
other issues,4" the court of appeals considered whether a state
court must apply the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens
when hearing admiralty claims.4"
B. The Decision
The Fifth Circuit recognized and employed "five concepts or
clusters of ideas" that guide federal preemption of maritime
claims in state courts:
[1 [Sltate law is not preempted when it contains a detailed
scheme to fill a gap in maritime law .... [2] [Sltate law is
not preempted when the law regulates behavior in which
the state has an especially strong interest .... [31
[MIaritime law preempts whenever a uniform rule will
facilitate maritime commerce, or, ... when non-uniform
regulation will work a material disadvantage to commercial
actors.... [4] [Mlaritime law preempts ... when the state
law impinges on international or interstate relations....
[51 [Pllaintiffs should win personal injury or death maritime
tort claims.6°
Basing its analysis on these factors, the court held that
"[flederal forum non conveniens analysis must preempt [a
state's open forum statute] in a maritime suit by an alien in
Texas courts."5 Judge Gee chose to analyze the unique aspects
of the forum non conveniens doctrine as applied to these five
underlying factors rather than labelling it "procedural" and
upholding the state law under a convenient, though erroneous,
45. Id.
46. Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1985).
47. Exxon, 817 F.2d at 304.
48. The court also considered Madame Choo's challenges to jurisdiction and the
anti-injunction act, id. at 309, as well as the current status of the Texas state claims.
Id. at 310.
49. Id. at 316-24.
50. Id. at 317-18.
51. Id. at 320.
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interpretation of the so-called "reverse-Erie" doctrine.52 Based
on the reverse of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins holding, 3 the doc-
trine requires that state courts sitting in admiralty apply only
substantive maritime law and leaves them free to apply state
procedural guidelines.'
While the court recognized that state procedural rules are
generally not preempted by federal maritime law, it purposeful-
ly stated that this is not because state procedural rules take
precedence over maritime law, but because they seldom conflict
with it.5 When they do, however, "it is clear that [the state
procedural rules] must yield."" Judge Gee simply refused to
rely upon a simple "procedural-substantive" dichotomy
"[because the Erie diversity doctrine and the 'reverse-Erie'
maritime doctrine spring from distinct principles and
policies." "
Under the five factor analysis, the Texas statute failed on all
counts.' As forum non conveniens is a well-established doc-
trine, it cannot be said that the statute operated "to fill gaps"
in the federal maritime law.59 Nor does the statute reflect a
valid use of state "police power, since a purported state interest
in preserving an action for non-resident aliens cannot be consid-
ered strong.""0
52. In Exxon the court stated:
It has been universally and correctly assumed that state procedural rules
govern actions in state courts under the 'savings to suitors' clause-the
"reverse-Erie metaphor captures this assumption perfectly. ... [If the
'reverse-Erie' doctrine is perfectly symmetrical, it follows that state courts
are not obligated to apply federal forum non conveniens analysis in mari-
time cases. . . . [But wie reject this facile syllogism; drawing conclusions
from metaphors is dangerous.
Id. at 319.
53. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
54. See Exxon, 817 F.2d at 316, 319-20.
55. Id. at 319.
56. Id.
57. Id. Judge Gee explained that "the substance/procedure dichotomy is simply
shorthand for distinctions that must be drawn on the basis of policies underlying the
doctrine. The 'reverse-Erie' question is whether the inconsistent state law, whether
deemed a matter of substance or procedure, conflicts with maritime law." Id. (cita-
tions omitted).
58. See id.
59. Id. at 320.
60. Id.
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Conversely, the important interests of uniformity, predictabil-
ity, and federal plenary power over international relations mili-
tate strongly in favor of preemption.6 Recognizing that contro-
versies arising out of international shipping are inevitable,
Judge Gee refused to apply the Texas statute to admiralty
cases and expose alien corporations to' the inconvenience of
litigation in states where their contacts, though quite tenuous,
satisfy the "minimum contacts" jurisdictional criteria.62
The holding in American Dredging Co. v. Miller" effectively
overrules the Fifth Circuit's holding in Exxon. Thus, it is likely
that the inconvenience and the inevitable stifling of trade due
to potential liability in distant state courts articulated by Judge
Gee will be realized following the decision in American
Dredging.
IV. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN
DREDGING Co. V. MILLER
William Robert Miller, a longtime resident of Mississippi, was
hired by American Dredging to work aboard a tugboat operat-
ing on the Delaware River.' American Dredging is a Pennsyl-
vania corporation with its principal place of business in New
Jersey.' Mr. Miller was injured in the course of employment
on the tug and received medical treatment in Pennsylvania,
New York, and upon his return home to Mississippi.66
In 1989, Mr. Miller filed suit in the Civil District Court for
the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana, under the Jones Act.' The
Jones Act authorizes a seaman injured in the course of employ-
ment to bring a cause of action for damages over which state
and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction.'
61. Id.
62. See id. at 321-23 (construing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 340 U.S. 64 (1938)).
63. 114 S. Ct. 981 (1994). See infra part IV.
64. Id. at 984.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 46 U.S.C-.A app. § 688 (West Cum. Supp. 1994).
68. American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 989.
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American Dredging filed a motion for dismissal under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens which the trial court granted
and the Louisiana Court of Appeals for the Fourth District
affirmed.69 The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the dis-
missal, holding that, under Article 123(c) of the Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure, forum non conveniens was not available in
Jones Act claims brought in state court.7" On certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, American Dredging contended
that the Louisiana statute prohibiting forum non conveniens
dismissals in state court admiralty proceedings was preempted
by the doctrine's application in federal court.7
V. AN ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF "CHARACTERISTIC
FEATURE"
Nowhere is it disputed that a state law will be preempted if
it works "material prejudice" to a characteristic feature of mari-
time law.72 According to Justice Scalia, forum non conveniens
is not one of those features.73 The Court recognized that the
doctrine enjoyed "its earliest and most frequent expression" in
matters of maritime law. 4 This is true not because the doc-
trine originated in admiralty, but rather because the unique
nature and considerations of maritime law, and the parties
involved therewith, often necessitate its application.75
Indeed, forum non conveniens was long recognized at common
law and was recognized as a common rule of application within
the federal courts as early as 1947.76 Recently, the availability
69. Miller v. American Dredging Co., 580 So.2d 1091 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
70. Miller v. American Dredging Co., 595 So.2d 615 (La. 1992), cert. granted, 113
S. Ct. 1840 (1993). The Louisiana Supreme Court found that "the doctrine of forum
non conveniens is not a substantive feature of the general maritime law." Id. at 619.
71. See American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 987-90.
72. Id. at 985; see also Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413
(1932).
73. American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 986.
74. Id.
75. That is, the transitory and global nature of many multi-national maritime
companies are frequently inconvenienced by suit in United States forums, the satis-
faction of jurisdictional requirements notwithstanding. Cf Robertson & Speck, supra
note 8.
76. Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). The court held that "this exception is
rooted in the kind of relief which these courts grant and the kinds of problems which
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of the doctrine was reaffirmed in a non-admiralty context."
However, given the provisions of the federal venue transfer
statute, forum non conveniens usually occurs only where the
proper forum is another country. 8
Because forum non conveniens is available in all federal cases
and has its roots in the common and civil law rather than in
admiralty, the majority held that the doctrine is not a "charac-
teristic feature" of admiralty. 9 Justice Scalia plainly asserts
that because forum non conveniens "neither originated in admi-
ralty nor has exclusive application there," Louisiana's refusal to
apply it "does not ... work 'material prejudice to [a]
characteristic featur [sic] of the general maritime law."8° This
statement apparently relies on a misuse of the term "character-
istic feature." Nowhere does Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,"'
upon which the majority relies for part of its federal preemp-
tion analysis, equate "characteristic feature" with a feature not
applied anywhere else. The fact that forum non conveniens
existed in case law and statutes long before United States ad-
miralty law should not negate its identity as a characteristic
feature of admiralty law. Jensen does not require that "charac-
teristic features" of admiralty be entirely exclusive to admiralty;
rather, "characteristic" means merely a distinguishing feature
or quality.
82
Thus, Justice Scalia and the majority erroneously interpreted
Jensen's "characteristic feature" language to mean "exclusive
feature." Justice Scalia ignores this inconsistency later in the
opinion when he discusses the evolution of the burden of proof
requirements of admiralty law. He compares these requirements
to a state statute which places the burden of proof in admiralty
upon the plaintiff rather than, as in the preempting federal
law, upon the defendant.' Though the idea of placing the bur-
they solve." Id. at 514.
77. Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). For a discussion of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Piper decision, see Watson, supra note 10, at 481-83.
78. Watson, supra note 10, at 481 (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988)).
79. American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 986-87.
80. Id. (quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917)).
81. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
82. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1987).
83. American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 988 (discussing Garrett v. Moore-McCormack
Co., 317 U.S. 239, 249 (1942)).
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den of proof upon the defendant neither originated nor func-
tions exclusively in admiralty, the Court does not hesitate to
preempt a state statute which conflicts with this characteristic
feature of maritime law."
In litigation, parties rely upon the placement of the burden of
proof; as a "characteristic feature," it is necessary for compe-
tent, successful research and trial strategy. The burden of proof
is designed to insure litigants full use of substantive rights
guaranteed under admiralty law.' It is difficult to see, then,
why a doctrine that preserves these substantive rights by as-
suring that they will only be litigated in a convenient forum is
not accorded at least the same status.
VI. FORUM NON CONVENIENS IS NEEDED FOR MARITIME LAW
UNIFORMITY
A. An Improper Reliance on Earlier Case Law
The majority next considered whether a state statute prohib-
iting forum non conveniens dismissals in state court admiralty
proceedings is invalid because it interferes with the uniform
application of the general federal maritime law." Justice
Scalia relied on the federalism arguments of Missouri ex rel.
Southern Railway v. Mayfield 7 in holding that "despite that
uniformity requirement... a state court presiding over an
action [under the Federal Employers Liability Act]'...
'should be freed to decide the availability of the principle of
forum non conveniens in these suits according to its own local
law.'" 9 This seems to suggest that, under the Jones Act, which
incorporates by reference the judicially developed doctrine of
84. Id. It is irrelevant that Justice Scalia discusses the point in the section deal-
ing with the need for uniformity and not in the section dealing with "characteristic
feature." Here, a change to a characteristic feature negates the possibility of uniformi-
ty in that feature's application.
85. Garrett, 317 U.S. at 245.
86. American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 987 (questioning Southern Pac. Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917)).
87. 340 U.S. 1 (1950).
88. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
89. American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 989 (quoting Mayfield, 340 U.S. at 5).
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liability in FELA,0 state courts are free to decide whether to
apply forum non conveniens at all.9
This reliance, however, is built upon an incomplete recitation
of Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Mayfield. Frankfurter held
that states may deny access to its courts through the applica-
tion of the doctrine.92 However, he also found that a state
court properly imposes forum non conveniens where it "enforces
its policy impartially ... so as not to involve a discrimination
against Employer's Liability Act suits.""3  The statute at
issue in American Dredging clearly involves a discrimination
against those bringing suits under the Jones Act and other
maritime litigants. In recognizing forum non conveniens in some
cases but specifically not in maritime actions, Louisiana actual-
ly contravenes the Mayfield interpretation of FELA, which, as
Justice Scalia asserts, the Jones Act should incorporate.95
Further, the holding in Mayfield reflects a lower court's deci-
sion to hear a case because it erroneously believed that the
doctrine of forum non conveniens could not bar a cause of action
in a state court if the action was based on a federal statute.96
Thus, the opinion only assured the courts of Missouri that they
were free to apply their own notions of forum convenience to
decide whether to hear certain FELA cases.97 Yet, Justice
Scalia reads Mayfield to hold that forum non conveniens is
solely a state consideration.98 However, the actual holding as-
serts that states may apply the doctrine as they see fit, ac-
cording to their notions of procedural policy.9 Unlike American
Dredging, then, Mayfield presupposes the availability of the
doctrine and holds that a state may apply it despite a federally-
created cause of action.
90. Id. (quoting Kerman v. American Dredging, 355 U.S. 426, 439 (1958)).
91. See Id.
92. Mayfield, 340 U.S. at 5.
93. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
94. LA. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. art. 123 (West Supp. 1994).
95. American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 989. The court found that the Jones Act
"adopts the judicially developed doctrine of liability' under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act." Id. (quoting Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 439
(1958)).
96. See Mayfield, 340 U.S. at 3.
97. Id. at 5.
98. American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 989.
99. Mayfield, 340 U.S. at 3.
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It has been held that FELA merely creates a cause of action
for injured parties; it does not guarantee one.00 Restating the
holding in Mayfield, states may decline valid jurisdiction when
necessary.'0 ' The statute in American Dredging, however, does
not allow for individual forum non conveniens rulings in partic-
ular suits. Lastly, it forbids such rulings in an entire class of
suits. O2 While the majority may have read this restriction to
be permissible, the holding of Mayfield would indicate other-
wise: "availability" of the doctrine should be in reference to a
judge's decision based on local law,'0 ' and should not indicate,
as American Dredging holds, state acceptance of the doctrine.
B. American Dredging Overlooks the True Reasons for
Uniformity
In an early case discussing federal preemption in the admi-
ralty context, the Supreme Court stated that, within the "sav-
ings to suitors clause"° . . . it could not have been the inten-
tion to place the rules and limits of maritime law under the
disposal and regulation of the several states."' 5 This super-
seding need for uniformity which Justice Scalia recognizes in
the American Dredging opinion undoubtedly concerns the inter-
est of potential parties and the Court recognizes the existence
of rules "upon which maritime actors rely in making decisions
about primary conduct-how to manage their business and
what precautions to take." °6 Justice Scalia further states that,
given the discretionary nature of forum non conveniens, "unifor-
mity and predictability of outcomes [are] almost impossible.""7
The discretionary nature of the doctrine is not disputed, and
there is an "unbroken line of decisions in the lower federal
courts 'holding that federal judges have' unqualified discretion"
in deciding whether to hear certain admiralty suits."8 While
100. See id. at 4.
101. Id.
102. LA. CODE Civ. PROC. ANN. art. 123 (West Supp. 1994).
103. 340 U.S. at 5.
104. 28 U.S.CA- § 1333(1) (West 1993).
105. American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981, 987 (1994) (quoting The
Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575 (1874)).
106. Id. at 988-89.
107. Id. at 989.
108. Id. at 994 (quoting Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413,
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it may be true that one cannot count on the fact that forum
non conveniens will be applied,"9 one may rely on the fact
that, in federal court, it can be applied."0 To this end, the Su-
preme Court in Gulf Oil v. Gilbert"' (a case relied upon by
the Court in American Dredging) offered several factors to be
considered when determining the validity of a forum non conve-
niens motion." Unequivocally foremost among these factors is
whether the inconvenience to the defendant substantially ne-
gates any convenience to the plaintiff."' After this determina-
tion, a court may consider public factors such as "administra-
tive difficulties"" 4 or the state's interest in hearing the claim
in deciding whether the chosen forum is proper."5 In effect,
the Louisiana statute"' bypasses the private-party require-
ments set forth in Gulf Oil and provides that the court's inter-
est in hearing maritime claims automatically supersedes any
interest of the defendant, even if the choice of forum operates
to "vex, harass, or oppress" him."7 Thus, the majority in
American Dredging tacitly overrules a case upon which they
rely. Specific factors have been delineated by previous Supreme
Court holdings,"' effectively creating a doctrine of uniform ap-
plication"9 within the federal courts upon which potential par-
ties and other businesses would be justified in relying.'2 A
party should not be discouraged from relying upon the proper
421-22 & nn.2-4 (1932)).
109. American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 989.
110. See generally Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 508.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 509.
116. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 123 (West Supp. 1994).
117. See Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). This proposition holds true
regardless of the fact that the plaintiffs choice of forum is presumptively proper. Id.
118. Id. at 506.
119. It should be remembered that federal law preempts state laws where there is
an interest in maintaining uniformity, so the state laws do not destroy the "unifor-
mity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial
character affecting the intercourse of the States with each other or with foreign
states." The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575 (1874).
120. In the American Dredging majority opinion, Justice Scalia recognized that
forum non conveniens, because of its "discretionary nature" cannot be relied upon in
making decisions about secondary conduct on behalf of litigants and must be pre-
empted for the sake of uniformity. American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 988-89.
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exercise of a judge's discretion, and the transitory nature of the
parties in admiralty suits inherently enlists judicial discretion.
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy pointed out that it is a "virtue,
not a vice, that the doctrine preserves discretion for courts to
find forum non conveniens in unusual but worthy cases.""2
The Louisiana statute at issue contravenes a commonly avail-
able federal court doctrine, and in doing so disrupts the unifor-
mity of general maritime law. Despite any inconvenience, a
party who would ordinarily have available the defense of forum
non conveniens would be forced to try its case in a Louisiana
state court. This would not be the case in federal court, where
maritime law originates and upon whose laws maritime busi-
nesses rely.2 Thus, by sanctioning this law, the Supreme
Court has condoned the lack of uniformity which admiralty
jurisdiction was designed to prevent. " This statement accu-
rately applies a key principle of The Lottawanna: the field of
maritime law, one of general application across the country and
across the world, is better regulated by the federal government
than by the apparently idiosyncratic states.m
VII. THE FALSE "PROCEDURAL VS. SUBSTANTIVE" DICHOTOMY
A. The "Reverse-Erie" Doctrine is Inapplicable Here
In the American Dredging dissent, Justice Kennedy asserted
that "[plrocedural or substantive, the forum non conveniens
doctrine promotes comity and trade," two of the main goals of
uniform admiralty law." This statement contravenes the di-
chotomy between procedure and substance upon which Justice
Scalia relies in the majority opinion.'28
121. Id. at 996.
122. This is because the doctrine of forum non conveniens is available and pop-
ularly applied in federal courts. See, e.g., Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd.,
285 U.S. 413 (1932).
123. See generally Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) (discussing the doctrine
of forum non conveniens); see also Robertson & Speck, supra note 8, at 950-51.
124. See generally The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1874).
125. American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 995.
126. Id. at 988. Justice Scalia states that because forum non conveniens is proce-
dural rather than substantive, state qualifications are not preempted by federal legis-
lation. Id.
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Traditional notions of substance versus procedure arise from
a "mirror image" of the holding of Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins. 7 Just as federal courts hearing diversity actions
are bound to apply the substantive law of the state in which
they sit pursuant to the Erie doctrine, state courts sitting in
admiralty are bound to apply substantive federal maritime
laws." This so-called "reverse-Erie" doctrine has gained ac-
ceptance due to facility of use and the easily-drawn parallels.
However, as American Dredging pointed out in its brief,'
and as Justice Kennedy realized," the relatively clear-cut dif-
ferences between substance and procedure discussed in Erie are
less clear in admiralty proceedings. The evolution of diversity
and admiralty jurisdiction have not been parallel. 3' Forum
non conveniens simply is not as disconnected from admiralty
law as are the elements of procedure which the Erie doctrine
addresses. Forum non conveniens is an "admiralty practice of
long standing,"'32 and, as American Dredging noted in their
brief, "the forum non conveniens problem.., is one that is
inescapably connected with the substantive rights of the par-
ties . . . [and not] 'merely' an 'administrative' problem.""
B. The Special Admiralty Considerations of the Doctrine
The line between "substance" and "procedure," even if it does
exist, does not provide any answers within the admiralty con-
text. The American Dredging majority attempts to nurture the
distinction in its reliance upon Garrett v. Moore-McCormack
Co., M by stating that the burden of proof, which "[i]n earlier
times ... was regarded as 'procedural'..." is now "viewed as
127. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
128. Robertson & Speck, supra note 8, at 953.
129. See Brief of Petitioner at 25-26, American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct.
981 (1994) (No. 91-1950), WL 409366 (U.S. La. Pet. Brief).
130. American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 995.
131. See Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo,. 817 F.2d 307, 319 (1987), rev'd on other
grounds, 486 U.S. 140 (1988).
132. Alexander M. Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum non Conveniens as Applied in the
Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35 CoRNELL L.Q. 12, 13 (1949).
133. See Brief of Petitioner at 24, American Dredging (No. 91-1950) (quoting
Bickel, supra note 132, at 17).
134. 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
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a matter of substance."'35 Justice Scalia relied heavily on the
language in Garrett, stating that the "burden of proof... 'was
a part of the very substance of... [a plaintiffs] claim and
cannot be considered a mere incident of a form of proce-
dure.""36 However, he fails to explain why the burden of proof
is part of the substance of the claim. Justice Black, elaborating
upon this point in the very sentence quoted by Justice Scalia,
does not say that the burden of proof is "substantive because it
is not procedural," as Justice Scalia would suggest, but rather
because it is "[d]eeply rooted in admiralty."3' Justice Black,
deconstructing the substance-procedure dichotomy, found a basis
in admiralty law which Justice Scalia chose to ignore.
The Garrett Court also remarked that "the state court was
bound to proceed in such manner that all the substantial rights
of the parties under controlling federal law would be protect-
ed." "'38 The Garrett Court recognized that there are issues, be-
sides those which are traditionally labeled substantive, that
bear significantly upon the parties' rights. Federal courts recog-
nize that certain rights, though substantive, should not be adju-
dicated in an inconvenient forum."9 Forum non conveniens is,
in this sense, "preservative" of the substantive rights of both
parties. Forcing a defendant to litigate in an extremely inconve-
nient forum cannot insure him of the "full scope of these [feder-
ally created] rights" under Garrett," even if it is "merely" a
"displacement" of venue requirements.' Garrett does not per-
mit this.
Thus, the Supreme Court's reliance upon Mayfield is unjusti-
fied for another reason: the effect of forum non conveniens upon
FELA cases does not involve an issue of the same importance
as admiralty uniformity."2 That the Jones Act incorporates by
reference the FELA liability standards cannot be disputed."
135. American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 988 (quoting Garrett, 317 U.S. at 249).
136. Id. at 988.
137. Garrett, 317 U.S. at 249 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 245 (emphasis added).
139. See generally Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
140. Garrett, 317 U.S. at 249.
141. See American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 988.
142. See generally Brief of Petitioner at 22-27, American Dredging, (No. 91-1950),
1993 WL 409366 (U.S. La. Pet. Brief).
143. American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 989.
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However, it should not be said that, in adopting these stan-
dards, Congress intended to undermine the importance of con-
venience in the admiralty court.' Yet, the American Dredg-
ing opinion finds precisely such an intent. This holding is based
upon an over reliance upon a "facile syllogism" 45 between the
Erie doctrine and the perhaps mislabeled reverse-Erie doctrine.
However, admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction did
not evolve symmetrically, and precise symmetry should be nei-
ther expected nor created.' As stated previously,'47  the
proper question in so-called "reverse-Erie" cases should be
whether a state law interferes with a characteristic feature of
general federal maritime law, or whether it works material
prejudice to the uniform application of that law.' Indeed,
"procedural or substantive, the forum non conveniens doctrine
promotes comity and trade. The States are not free to under-
mine these goals.""
VIII. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE AMERICAN DREDGING DECISION
The future of the forum non conveniens doctrine in admiralty,
whether in state or federal court, does not look promising fol-
lowing the decision of American Dredging v. Miller. Comity and
trade, both at the heart of uniform maritime law, will suffer. It
is likely that shipping companies, knowing that minimum con-
tacts with Louisiana or states with similar laws expose them to
potentially infinite lawsuits, will be loathe to establish those
contacts. 5 ' Much litigation could "turn on the fortuities of
diversity."
5
'
144. See generally Brief of Petitioner, American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct.
981 (1994) (No. 91-1950).
145. Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d 307, 319 (1987), rev'd on other
grounds, 486 U.S. 140 (1988).
146. Id.
147. See supra part MI.B.
148. Exxon, 817 F.2d at 319.
149. American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 995.
150. Cf Exxon, 817 F.2d at 322. In his opinion in Gulf Oil, Justice Jackson noted
that the Supreme Court had held the "use of an inappropriate forum in one case an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501, 505 (1947) (construing Davis v. Farmers Coop. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1922)).
151. Exxon, 817 F.2d at 320. Because cases brought under the "savings to suitors"
clause are not within the ambit of federal question jurisdiction (though they do in-
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In Garrett, Justice Black expressed fear that if state courts
could "substantially alter the rights of either litigant ... the
remedy afforded by the state would not enforce, but would
actually deny, federal rights" that Congress tries to ensure.'52
Because of the American Dredging holding, a formerly impor-
tant principle of maritime law will be considered only if the
admiralty case involves diversity of citizenship. In many situa-
tions,'53 Louisiana law will prevent a federal court from exer-
cising an important doctrine. Justice Kennedy "thought that the
required accommodation was the other way around.""5
Perhaps above all else, the application of the Louisiana law
will often result in irrational outcomes,"' cutting against pre-
viously superseding ideas of uniformity. Alien parties who can-
not satisfy the diversity requirements of federal court will be
stranded in remote courts in which forum non conveniens is
forbidden, while suits involving an aggrieved United States
citizen and an alien defendant will be removable to federal
courts and almost certainly dismissed on forum non conveniens
grounds.'56 Judge Gee could not "tolerate this pointless intru-
sion on the basic uniformity of the maritime law,"'57 but in
American Dredging, it is given life.
IX. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of forum non conveniens has long been a charac-
teristic feature of maritime law, one upon which various ship-
volve admiralty claims), the only possibility for removal to federal court under 28
U.S.C. § 1441 (1988) is through traditional diversity jurisdiction: diversity of citizen-
ship and a fifty-thousand dollar or more claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988). For a more
in-depth discussion, see Robertson & Speck, supra note 8, at 943-44. Further, in the
American Dredging dissent, Justice Kennedy suggests that the holding marks a dan-
gerous precedent for the future of uniform federal law. He wonders if, in states like
Louisiana, federal courts will even bother with forum non conveniens motions, know-
ing that a plaintiff could simply bring suit in state court. American Dredging, 114 S.
Ct. at 986.
152. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 245 (1942).
153. For examples, and arguably "irrational" results of these situations, see Exxon,
817 F.2d at 321.
154. American Dredging, 114 S. Ct. at 996 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
155. Exxon, 817 F.2d at 320.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 321.
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ping companies could rely and under which they could be as-
sured that they would not be compelled to suffer inconvenient
lawsuits in distant forums. Because of the importance of main-
taining uniformity and harmony in admiralty cases, this reli-
able doctrine should not be circumvented by the idiosyncracies
of the laws of the several states. Further, its importance should
not be undermined by references to a facile and imprecise reli-
ance upon a procedural-substantive dichotomy. The Supreme
Court, in American Dredging Co. v. Miller, considered the doc-
trine a simple procedural matter, unimportant to admiralty
uniformity. Forum non conveniens, now irreparably discredited
in admiralty law, can no longer assure litigants of the uniformi-
ty on which maritime law is based and upon which litigants
have traditionally depended.
Harris L. Kay
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